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STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The sole issue presented in this case is whether the Industrial Commission of Utah abused its discretion and erred in denying the Plaintiff an opportunity to present new medical evidence
at a hearing to support his claim for permanent total disability
benefits.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
There is no question that Plaintiff, Carl Jay Spencer, was
injured
304.

in an industrial accident
On that

date, while

on November

employed

11, 1982.

Tr.

by N. V. Swire Bottlers,

Plaintiff was involved in an accident while driving an eighteenwheeler

in Wyoming.

Plaintiff
leg.

sustained

Tr. 304.

Tr. 304.
multiple

As a result of that accident,

contusions

of

the head, arm and

Plaintiff was discharged "although he was appar-

ently a little dazed.ff

Tr. 304.

The following day, November 12,

1982, while driving an eighteen-wheeler back from Denver, Colorado, Plaintiff blacked out, wrecking his truck and sustaining
another head injury.

Tr. 304.

Plaintiff suffered from numerous problems including dizziness,

forgetfulness, headaches, blackouts

Tr. 304.

and

blurred

Plaintiff was treated by numerous doctors.

vision.

The treat-

ments included a "psychiatric consultation" while convalescing at
St. Marks Hospital.

Tr. 304.

In July, 1983, Plaintiff returned to work performing light
duties.

On September 9, 1983, however, Plaintiff was dismissed

from his employment.

Tr. 304.
-1-

Though Plaintiff has been offered

employment as a truck driver, he was never hired once potential
employers learned of Plaintiff's history of seizures.
On June

Tr. 304.

1, 1984, the time of the hearing, Plaintiff was

suffering from constant headaches, tenseness and soreness in his
neck.

Plaintiff also noticed loss of strength in his right arm

and balance problems.

Tr. 304.

In about 1960 or 1961, Plaintiff had his toes frozen on his
right

foot, which

June 29, 1970.

gave

him

trouble

until

he

had

surgery

on

The Plaintiff did well until he dropped a garbage

can on his toes in July, 1970 while working for Salt Lake City as
a sanitation worker.

His fourth and fifth toes and fifth meta-

tarsal head were eventually amputated.
The Plaintiff's next
ber 18, 1976.
and

apparently

working.
On

Tr. 305.

injury occurred

on or about

Septem-

At that time, he was working for Salt Lake County
sustained

an injury

to his left shoulder while

Tr. 275, 305.
or

about

November

18,

1976,

the

Plaintiff

sustained

another injury to his left shoulder while lifting garbage cans.
He was again lifting when he heard something tear in his left
shoulder.

On January 3, 1977, a surgical repair of the Plain-

tiff's left shoulder was performed.

Tr. 275, 305.

Following a formal hearing in this case, he was referred to
a Medical Panel.

The Medical Panel Report dated December 11,

1984 authored by three physicians concluded that the Plaintiff
suffered from the following medical problems:
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A.

15% permanent partial impairment of the whole body due
to the industrial accident of 11/11/82 as the result of
loss of body function. Tr. 258.

B.

20% permanent partial impairment of the whole body due
to pre-existing conditions broken down as follows:

C.

(1)

30% loss of body function of the left upper extremity for the pre-existing industrial injury of
1977. Tr. 257.

(2)

7% loss of body function of the right foot for the
pre-existing injury of 1960 or 1961. Tr. 257.

32% permanent partial impairment of the whole body for
loss of body function from all causes and conditions.
Tr. 276.

The Plaintiff is a 41-year-old former truck driver who did
not finish the fifth grade in school.

Tr. 276, 288.

The sever-

ity of his various impairments, all of which make it impossible
for him to return to his former work, or any other gainful activity, were vividly underscored by him in the manner in which he
testified, as well as in his appearance and demeanor at his hearing.

He further indicated that his present activities involved

watering his lawn, taking walks, pulling weeds and "puttering"
around his house.

Tr. 75-76.

His mental impairment, clearly

observable during his testimony, was subsequently underscored by
Dr. Moench in his consultative examination.
Plaintiff's overall physical condition, based upon the new
records filed from St. Marks Hospital, indicate that he now experiences grand mal seizures on a weekly basis (Tr. 332), which
is substantially

more

medical evidence; and

than was

previously

found

this additional change

in the prior

in his condition

underscores both the applicability of a permanent total disabil-

-3-

ity claim, as well as the need for the taking of additional testimony relative to his changed condition.

In this regard, and as

was communicated to the Administrative Law Judge, it was anticipated that testimony on this point would be given by the Plaintiff, his wife, and others, in addition to a medical report to be
received
above.

from Mr. Spencer's treating physician, as referred to
Tr. 351.

Subsequent

to the entry of the Administrative Law Judge's

decision in this case, the Plaintiff submitted new medical (Tr .
367-370, 331-335) and rehabilitation data (Tr. 314-330), and has
further produced evidence tending to show a continuing deterioration

of his mental

unemployability.

and

physical

condition

and his

continuing

Tr. 363.

The Plaintiff specifically requested of both the Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial Commission that his original
Motion

for Reconsideration

addressed

to the Administrative Law

Judge be held in abeyance for an appropriate period of time to
allow for the filing of a detailed treating physician's report
and other medical

records

previously

requested

addressing

the

only issue remaining in this case, namely, the Plaintiff's unemployability.

Tr. 351.

Plaintiff filed a four-page detailed medical letter addressing

the Plaintiff's

unemployability

and

the effect

that his

medical condition has had upon that status (Tr. 367-370), as well
as a letter

report

from a consulting neurologist

concerning a

neurological examination performed during the latter part of last
year (Tr. 371), neither of which was examined by either the Ad-

ministrative Law Judge or by the Industrial Commission before
entering the final Order herein.
In addition

to the said medical reports and records, the

Plaintiff's treating physician also referred the Plaintiff to the
University of Utah Medical Center for additional and heretofore
untried

medical

Plaintiff's

tests

in an effort

problems, and

to attempt

to determine

physical or mental etiology.

whether

to define

the

they are of a

Tr. 367.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The

Industrial

Commission

modify or change former

has

continuing

jurisdiction

findings where such is justified.

dismissing Plaintiff's Application

for Hearing, the

to
In

Industrial

Commission violated a basic tenet of administrative law by acting
capriciously

and

arbitrarily.

To supports

its capricious and

arbitrary action, the Industrial Commission relied upon the doctrine of res judicata.
In relying upon the doctrine of res judicata and by ignoring
Plaintiff's new medical evidence, the Industrial Commission has
prohibited Plaintiff from even applying for benefits to which he
might be entitled.
This Court should not condone such action by the Industrial
Commission

and, therefore, must reverse the Industrial Commis-

sion's decision to grant Plaintiff a hearing.
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ARGUMENT
I
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION HAS
CONTINUING JURISDICTION UNDER THE
WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT TO MODIFY AWARDS
•

•

•

-

•

•

•

-

'

Utah Code Annotated, §35-1-78 of Utah Workers1 Compensation
Act

(1981) empowers

the

Industrial

Commission

with

continuing

jurisdiction by providing as follows:
The powers and jurisdiction of the commission
over each case shall be continuing, and it
may from time to time make such modification
or change with respect to former findings, or
orders with respect thereto, as in its opinion may be justified, provided, however ...
In the landmark decision of Buxton v. Industrial Commission
of Utah, Utah, 587 P.2d

121

(1978),

a unanimous Utah

Supreme

Court confirmed that the clear and unambiguous language of §35-178 "empowers the Commission to make such modifications of former
findings and orders as
at 123.

f

in its opinion may be justified111.

Id.

See also Mecham v. Industrial Commission of Utah, Utah,

692 P.2d 783 (1984) wherein the Court affirmed Buxton.
In construing Section 35-1-78 this Court has required, as a
basis for modification "evidence of some significant change or
new development in the claimant's injury or proof of the previous
award's inadequacy."

Kennecott Copper Corporation v. Industrial

Commission of Utah, 19 Utah 2d 158, 427 P.2d

952, 953 (1967).

Buxton, supra at 123.
Professor Larson in his treatise on Workmen's Compensation
Law, Section 81.31(e) (Supp. July 1985), notes that

_6-

f,

a change in

Claimant's ability to get or hold employment, or to maintain his
earlier earning level, should be considered a 'change in condition1, even though Claimants

physical condition may have re-

mained unchanged."
Applying the foregoing authorities to the instant case, it
becomes evident that the Industrial Commission acted capriciously
and arbitrarily

in denying Plaintiff a hearing on the issue of

whether he is now permanently and totally disabled.
On January 2, 1986, the Industrial Commission affirmed the
Order of the Administrative Law Judge which denied Plaintiff the
opportunity for a hearing to present evidence in support of his
claim that the previous award should be modified,.

The Adminis-

trative Law Judge construed Section 35-1-78 narrowly and erroneously as requiring only "a change in condition".

Tr . 344.

As

established above, this Court has interpreted that section as requiring "some change pr

new,development

proof

award fs

of

the

previous

Corporation, supra.

in claimant's injury or

inadequacy .ff

Kennecott

Copper

[Emphasis added].

The Administrative Law Judge merely examined one report from
the St. Marks Hospital Emergency Room to deny Plaintiff the right
to a hearing.

Tr. 343.

tive Law Judge can deny

It is submitted that if the Administraany qualified

applicant, such

as the

Plaintiff, the right to a hearing based upon one report, then the
constitutional principles upon which our system of jurisprudence
are built will surely disintegrate.
Plaintiff has certainly demonstrated the inadequacy of the
previous award.

Not only has the Social Security Administration

of

the United

States

Department

of Health

and Human

Services

determined that the Applicant is totally disabled from all lines
of suitable, gainful employment
Rehabilitation

(Tr. 348), but the Division of

Services of the Utah

State Office of Education

concluded that Plaintiff was not a feasible candidate for competitive employment and there is no reasonable expectation of vocational rehabilitation.

Tr. 314-330.

These findings of total disability and no reasonable expectation of vocational rehabilitation coupled with the irrefutable
fact that Plaintiff has not been employed since his accident are
strong

evidence

that

the May 29, 1985

(Tr. 306-307) award of

benefits is inadequate.
Additionally, the Plaintiff has proferred new medical evidence indicating not only the need for continuing medical treatment, but also demonstrating change in his injury.
Plaintiff has made out a prima facie case justifying the
change of his disability rating from partial to total.
mission's

The Com-

refusal "to make findings and an award of permanent

total disability is so contrary to reason that it is capricious
and arbitrary11.

Buxton, supra at 124.

II
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRED IN APPLYING
THE DOCTRINE! OF RES JUDICATA IN DENYflftT
THE PLAINTIFF'S APPLICATION FOR HEARING
In dismissing Plaintiff's Application for Hearing (Tr. 343344), the Administrative Law Judge injected the doctrine of res
judicata into this case for the purpose of supporting his deci-8-

sion.

Tr. 344.

This is a questionable attempt by the Adminis-

trative Law Judge to preserve a viable doctrine of law which has
no application to the instant case.
This Court in Mollerup Van Lines v. Adams, 16 Utah 2d 235,
398 P.2d 880 (1965), held that the ordinary rule of res judicata
is not applicable to cases such as the present case.

In Mollerup

Van Lines, the Plaintiff was awarded a supplemental award by the
Commission.

Affirming the Commission's award the Court stated:

The ordinary rule of res judicata is not
applicable to the instant proceeding. Inherent in the act is recognition that industrial
injuries cannot always be diagnosed with
absolute accuracy, nor their consequences
predicted with complete certainty.
Section
35-1-78, U.C.A. 1953 provides that "the powers and jurisdiction of the Commission over
each case shall be continuing, and it may
from time to time make such modification or
change with respect to former findings, or
others with respect thereto, as in its opinion may be justified11.
Accordingly, even
though the Commission has made an award, if
there later develops some substantial change
or new development with respect to the injury
than was known or was contemplated at the
time of the original award, upon proper proceedings the Commission can make such adjustment as is just and reasonable and in conformity with the act. _Id_. at 883.
In the instant case, the issue of permanent total disability
was considered by the Administrative Law Judge who specifically
found that a finding of tentative permanent and total disability
was not being "made at this time".

Tr. 306.

Upon receiving credible and uncontradicted evidence supporting Plaintiff1s claim for a finding of permanent total disability, the Administrative Law Judge ignored this Court's construc-
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tion of §35-1-78 and hid behind the walls of the doctrine of res
judicata

to dismiss Plaintiff's Application

for Hearing.

Tr.

344.
Based

upon

this Court's

ruling

that

the doctrine of res

judicata is not applicable to cases such as this, it is submitted
that

the Commissioner's Order dated January 2, 1986, affirming

the Administrative Law Judge's award of November 15, 1985, must
be reversed and this case must be remanded for a hearing.

Ill
IN CASE THERE IS ANY DOUBT RESPECTING THE
RIGHT TO COMPENSATION, SUCH DOUBT SHOULD
BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF THE EMPLbYffF
The Utah Supreme Court has long recognized that one of the
permanent purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act is to protect
the

employee

employee

and

those

is seriously

dependent

upon

him

injured or killed.

in

the

event

the

Prows v. Industrial

Commission, Utah, 610 P.2d 1362, 1363 (1980), citing Chandler v.
Industrial Commission, Utah, 55 Utah 213, 184 P. 1020, 1021-1022,
(1919).

To achieve this purpose the Court has consistently es-

poused the view that "in case there is any doubt respecting the
right to compensation, such doubt must be resolved
the employee".

Prows, supra at 1364.

in favor of

See also McPhie v. Indus-

trial Commission, Utah, 567 P.2d 153, 155 (1977).

If such doubt

exists here, it should be resolved in favor of the Plaintiff.
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CONCLUSION
There can be no doubt that the Planitiff
abled.

The medical

records

and

is totally dis-

findings by both

the Social

Security Administration of the United States Department of Health
and Human Services and the Division of Rehabilitation Services of
the Utah State Office of Education support Plaintiff's claim for
total permanent disability benefits.
Despite the overwhelming

and uncontroverted

evidence, the

Industrial Commission has refused-to Plaintiff a hearing to present his claim for permanent total disability benefits.
This refusal by the Industrial Commission is an unconscionable abuse of discretion.

Although this Court must give weight

to decisions rendered by the Industrial Commission, to affirm the
decision in this matter would be a signal to the Industrial Commission

that

it can

ignore sound

principles

of law and valid

evidence in rendering completely arbitrary and capricious decisions .
Based upon the foregoing arguments, and upon all documents
contained

in this Court's record, it is respectfully submitted

that

Industrial

the

Commission's

decision

denying

Plaintiff a

right to a hearing must be reversed.
DATED this _J2S}j£ day of May, 1986.
BNEY & DABNEY,/Pj

V1 B&m ft"S ' DABNfiY ,J fl&Ti
A t t o r n e y s for
-11-

Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed
copies,
the

postage

pre-paid,

of

the

four

(4) true and correct

foregoing

document

on

this

'gn-rH. day of May, 1986, to the following:
David L. Wilkinson, Esq.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF UTAH
Attorneys for Industrial Commission
Office of the Attorney General
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Henry K. Chai II, Esq.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Employer/Insurance Carrier
P. 0. Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110

D/BN!EY & DABNEY, PIG.

I"
Attorney? for Plaintiff
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 83000965

CARL JAY SPENCER,
Applicant,
VS.
N. V. SWIRE BOTTLERS and/or INDUSTRIAL
INDEMNITY and/or SECOND INJURY FUND,
Defendants.

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

HEARING:

Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160 East
Broadway, Salt Lake City, Utah, on June 1, 198A, at 8:30 o'clock
a.m.; same being pursuant to Order and Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

Timothy C. Allen, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The Applicant was present and represented by Virginius Dabney,
Attorney at Law.
The Defendants were represented by Henry K. Chai, II, Attorney
at Law.

At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the medical issues and
questions were submitted to a Medical Panel appointed by the Administrative
Law Judge. The Medical Panel Report was received and copies were distributed
to the parties. Applicant, by and through counsel, filed objections to the
Medical Panel Report, alleging that the Applicant's total impairment due to
all causes and conditions was 45% rather than the 32% as found by the Panel,
and that the Panel had failed to rate the Applicant's psychiatric impairment.
With regard to the first allegation, the Administrative Law Judge notes that
the 45% rating is the rating of the treating physician, Dr. Hebertson, and
represents his opinion of the Applicant's impairment. While not impugning the
integrity ot the treating physician, the Administrative Law Judge feels that
the rating of the Medical Panel Report is reasonable, since the Medical Panel
consisted of an orthopedic surgeon, a psychiatrist, and a neurologist. With
regard to Applicant's second contention, that the Panel made no rating for
psychiatric problems, this is clearly erroneous. A careful review of the
Panel Report will reveal that the Panel gave the Applicant 15% "due to
factitious seizure disorder and head pain, which are due to psychological
stresses.'* (Emphasis supplied.) Having reviewed the medical evidence and the
Medical Panel Report, the Administrative Law Judge finds that the objections
of the Applicant to the Medical Panel Report should be denied, and the Medical
Panel Report is admitted into evidence.

CARL JAY SPENCER
ORDER
PAGE TWO

FINDINGS OF FACT:
This case concerns the extent of impairment due to the industrial
injury of November 11, 1982, and whether there has been any temporary total
disability as a result of that injury since September 9, 1983,
The Applicant herein was employed as a truck driver, for the
Defendant N. V. Swire Bottlers, which bottles Coca-Cola.
On November 12,
1982, the Applicant was driving an eighteen-wheeler back from Denver,
Colorado, when he sustained an industrial injury. On the prior day, November
11, 1982, the Applicant was in Wyoming when he was run off the road, and as a
result sustained multiple contusions of the head, arm, and leg.
He was
discharged although he was apparently a little dazed. He continued on until
he arrived in Colorado, and at that time he blacked out, wrecking his truck
and sustaining another head injury. He was taken to the Vail Hospital, but
had no recall of that treatment. He was returned to Salt Lake City and on
November 18, 1982, was seen by Dr. Slawson complaining of dizziness, forgetfulness, and headaches. Dr. Slawson referred Mr. Spencer to the Holy Cross
Hospital for x-rays and a CT scan, which were normal. Dr. Slawson concluded
that the Applicant was suffering from a concussion.
After continuing problems, the Applicant was
an EEG on December 2, 1982, which was unremarkable.
Dr. Robert Hood and was seen on December 22, 1982,
that Mr. Spencer had a post-cconcussion syndrome.
still complaining of blackouts and blurred vision,
determined that he should see Dr. Wayne Hebertson.

referred to Dr. Nord for
He was then referred to
and the doctor concluded
He returned to Drc Hood
and at that time it was

Dr. Hebertson saw the Applicant on January 31, 1983, and he was seen
again by the doctor on February 11, 1983, upon his admission to the St. Mark's
Hospital.
While there, he received various diagnostic studies and was
released on February 15. While in the hospital, he was also seen in a
psychiatric consultation by Dr. McCann, who felt that the Applicant was having
conversion reaction symptoms. Mr- Spencer vas started on Dilantin, and was
told to return for followup to Dr. Hebertson.
He continued his followup treatment with Dr. Hebertson, and on July
2, 1983, returned to light duty at his place of employment. His light duty
consisted of stacking pallets, bottles, and other tasks around the warehouse.
In September of 1983, the Applicant was advised that there was no more light
duty available to him, and he was laid off on September 9, 1983. The
Applicant has not looked for work since his layoff, however, he did testify
that people have offered him truck driving jobs, but when they are informed of
his history of seizures, he has not been hired.
The Applicant's present complaints are that he has constant headaches, but that he has no trouble with his vision or hearing, but does have
some problems with his neck tensing up and getting sore. He has also noticed
problems with his balance, and some loss of strength in his right arm.

CARL JAY SPENCER
ORDER
PAGE THREE

In 1960 or '61, Mr. Spencer had his toes frozen on his right foot,
which gave him trouble until he had surgery on June 29, 1970. He did well
following this surgery, until he dropped a garbage can on his toes in July of
1970, while working for Salt Lake City as a sanitation worker. He continued
to have chronic pain until Dr. Morrow finally amputated the fourth and fifth
toes and the fifth metatarsal head on or about January 19, 1971. As a result
of that surgery, the doctor found that the Applicant had a 7% permanent
partial impairment of his right foot, and the Applicant was paid benefits in
the amount of $54.20 per week for 8.4 weeks or a total of $455.28 as a result
of this injury. At the hearing, the Applicant denied any residual problems
with his right foot, and also denied that hs used an appliance or prosthetic
device in his right shoe.
The Applicant's next injury occurred on or about September 18, 1976.
At that time, he was working for Salt Lake County and sustained an injury to
his left shoulder while working. On or about November 18, 1976, the Applicant
sustained another injury to his left shoulder while lifting garbage cans, when
he heard a pop and something tear in his left shoulder after lifting a can.
On January 3, 1977, Dr. Morrow performed a surgical repair of the Applicant's
left shoulder. He continued to be seen by Dr. Vanderhooft in followup, until
he was eventually released and given a rating of 30% of the left upper
extremity. Mr. Spencer was paid 56.16 weeks of permanent partial impairment
benefits at the rate of $112.67 for this injury by Salt Lake County.
Since there was an allegation that the Applicant was still temporarily totally disabled beyond ^September 9, 1983, the date on which he was laid
off, the file was submitted to a Medical Panel for its evaluation. The
Medical Panel found that the Applicant has not been temporarily totally
disabled since September 9, 1983, as a result of the industrial injury of
November 11, 1982. The Panel also found that as a result of the industrial
injury of November 11, 1982, the Applicant has sustained a 15% permanent
partial impairment ,fdue to factitious seizure disorder and head pain, which
are due to psychological stresses." In this regard, the Panel also stated as
follows: "We find no organic basis for the constant headaches, and no evidence that a bona fide seizure disorder exists. Instead, the Medical Panel
believes that the patient's symptoms are related to psychological function."
The Panel also found that there was no aggravation by the industrial injury of
either the Applicant's pre-existing foot problem or his shoulder problem, and
that there were no other pre-existing conditions. The Administrative Law
Judge adopts the findings of the Medical Panel as his own.
The Applicant, by and through counsel, has urged that a finding of
tentative permanent and total disability be made in this case, and as support
thereof he relies upon the "odd lot doctrine" adopted by the Utah Supreme
Court in Nolan W. Marshall v. Industrial Commission, filed April 5, 1984. In
reviewing that case, I note that the Court found "A majority of the odd-lot
cases are concerned with employees whose work required physical labor, and
many of those employees were fifty years old or older with moderate or little
education." In this case, the Applicant is thirty-nine years old, which would

CARL JAY SPENCER
ORDER
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hardly classify him as an older worker as anticipated by the odd lot doctrine* In addition, the Applicant's testimony at the evidentiary hearing was
that people have offered him truck driving jobs, but after he informs them of
his history of seizures, he had not been hired. However, the Medical Panel
found no organic basis for these seizures* Accordingly, the Administrative
Law Judge finds that the weight of evidence vitiates a finding of tentative
permanent and total disability, and none will be made at this time.
In assessing the liability for an industrial injury, it is necessary
to utilize the Hair formula. Briefly, Hair provides that the impairment due
to the industrial injury will be assessed as against the remaining unimpaired
person for rating purposes. In the instant matter, the Applicant had a 7%
permanent partial impairment of the right foot due to the injury with Salt
Lake City, and a 30% impairment of the left upper extremity due to his injury
sustained with Salt Lake County. The 7% right foot impairment equals 2% of
the whole man, and the 30% left upper extremity rating equals 18% of the whole
man making a combined pre-existing impairment of 20% of the whole man, thereby
rendering Mr. Spencer an 80% whole man for rating purposes as of the date of
his industrial injury. As a result of that injury, he sustained a 15% impairment which when applied to an 80% unimpaired man equals a 12% permanent
partial impairment due to the industrial injury of November 11, 1982. Since
the Applicant has previously received benefits for his pre-existing conditions, he is not entitled to an award from the Second Injury Fund, however,
the carrier, Industrial Indemnity, is entitled to reimbursement of 20/32 or
63% of the temporary total compensation and/or medical expenses paid on behalf
of the Applicant as a resulfc-of the industrial injury of November 11, 1092.
On November 11, 1982, the Applicant was earning wages sufficient to
entitle him to the maximum award for temporary total disability and permanent
partial impairment benefits of $284.00 per week and $189.00 per week, respectively.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Carl Jay Spencer is entitled to workers' compensation benefits for
the industrial accident he sustained on November 11, 1982, which accident
arose out of or during the course or scope of his employment with the
Defendant, V. V. Swire Bottlers, Incorporated.

ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the
Incorporated, and/or Industrial Indemnity,
at the rate of $189.00 per week for 37.44
compensation for a 12% permanent partial
injury of November 11, 1982, said benefits
attorney's fee to be awarded hereinafter.

Defendants, N. V. Swire Bottlers,
pay Carl Jay Spencer, compensation
weeks or a total of $7,076.16, as
impairment due to the industrial
to be paid in a lump sum less the
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendants, N. V. Swire Bottler,
Incorporated, and/or Industrial Indemnity, pay Virginius Dabney, attorney for
the Applicant, the sum of $1,415.23, for services rendered in this matter, the
same to be deducted from the aforesaid award to the Applicant and remitted
directly to his office.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendants, N. V. Swire Bottlers,
Incorporated, and/or Industrial Indemnity, pay all medical expenses incurred
as a result of the industrial injury of November 11, 1982; said benefits to be
paid in accordance with the Medical and Surgical Fee Schedule of the
Industrial Commission of Utah.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, Industrial Indemnity, shall
be entitled to reimbursement from the Second Injury Fund for 63% of the
temporary total compensation and/or medical expenses incurred on behalf of the
Applicant as a result of the industrial injury of November 11, 1982; said
reimbursement to be had upon the submission of a verified petition of the
Administrator of the Second Injury Fund indicating the amounts so expended.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and unless so filed this
Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal.

Passed by the Industrial Commission
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this
Jiql^
day of May
, 1985.
ATTEST:

/s/ Linda J. Strasburg
Linda J. Strasburg
Commission Secretary

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that on the
J??/^
day of
May
, 1985, a copy of the
attached Order was mailed to the following persons at the following addresses,
postage paid:
Henry K. Chai, II, Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 3000
Salt Lake City, UT 84110
Virginius Dabney, Attorney at Law
Kearns Building, Suite 412
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84104
Industrial Indemnity
P.O. Box 7905
Murray, UT 84107
Gilbert A. Martinez, Administrator
Second Injury Fund
Carl Jay Spencer
1318 West 1300 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84104
N. V. Swire Bottlers, Inc.
P.O. Box 1647
Salt Lake City, UT 84110
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N. V. SWIRE BOTTLERS (COCA-COLA)
and/or INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY
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On May 29, 1985, the Administrative Law Judge entered Findings
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order in this matter.
At that time,
Administrative Law Judge also ruled on the merits of the Applicant's claim
permanent and total disability. No Motion for Review having been filed by
Applicant, that finding and Order became the final award of the Commission.

of
the
for
the

On October 15, 1985, the Applicant, by and through counsel, filed an
Application for Hearing seeking interest and permanent and total disability,
and payment of certain medical expenses. Thereafter, the Defendants, by and
through counsel, answered the Application, and contended that no further
proceedings were necessary since all medical expenses incurred as the result
of the industrial injury had been paid, and there had been no change in the
Applicant's condition since the Order of May 29, 1985.
In reviewing the additional evidence which has been submitted, the
Administrative Law Judge notes that the claimed unpaid medical expenses
concern an incident which occurred on January 31, 1985. The report from
St. Mark's Emergency Room indicates:
"Wife states husband tripped—falling
forward catching himself with his arms. Did not hit head. While on the
ground, wife reports grand mal seizure . . . ." The final diagnosis of the
hospital was that the Applicant had sustained a cervical strain and a
contusion of his left wrist. Based on the foregoing account of the incident,
the Administrative Law Judge finds that Mr. Spencer tripped and fell,
sustaining some injuries which were not related to the industrial injury. He
appears to have had a seizure after he fell, but the seizure did not cause the
fall.
Prior to the issuance of the Order of May 29, 1985, the Applicant, by
and through counsel, had fully briefed and plead the issue of permanent and
total disability.
Thereafter, the Administrative Law Judge ruled on the
merits of that claim, and found that the Applicant was not permanently and
totally disabled. If the Applicant disagreed with that finding at that time,
he should have filed a Motion for Review with the Commission, and he should
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have obtained an extension to secure a report from the Division of
Rehabilitation Services.- Instead, the Applicant let the Order of May 29,
1985, become final. Now, the Applicant seeks to invoke the provisions of
Section 78 to modify the prior finding with respect to permanent total
disability, although he did not see fit to appeal that finding. Section 78
provides that the Commission shall exercise continuing jurisdiction over
claims, and by case law this has been interpreted as requiring a change in
condition. In reviewing the file, I note that there has been no change in the
Applicant's condition. Rather, the only "change" has been the submission of a
report from the Division of Rehabilitation Services. However, this is not
evidence of a change per se, since this issue was extensively and fully raised
by Applicant's counsel prior to the entry of the Order of May 29, 1985.
Therefore, if the term res judicata is to have any meaning or effect at all,
then the latest Application for Hearing of the Applicant contending that he is
permanently and totally disabled must be dismissed. Otherwise, the doctrine
of res judicata will be an empty phrase, honored more in its breach than in
its acceptance. If the issue of permanent total disability had not previously
been addressed, then the Application for Hearing of the Applicant would be
meritorious; but to use such a filing as a means of avoiding the error of not
filing a timely appeal is a subterfuge and procedural miscarriage which the
Administrative Law Judge will not be a party to.

ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Application for Hearing of Carl Jay
Spencer claiming additional medical expenses for a trip and fall on January
31, 1985, and permanent and total disability should be, and the same is
hereby, dismissed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing
shall be riled in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof;
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections; and unless so
filed, this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal.

Passed by the Industrial Commission
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this
Jd'.fJi
day of November, 1985^
ATTEST:
/s/ Linda J. Strasburg
Linda J. Strasburg
Commission Secretary

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that on November
J5
1985, a copy of the attached
Order in the case of Carl Jay Spencer issued November
t~
1985, was
mailed to the following persons at the following addresses, postage paid:
Erie V. Boorman, Administrator
Second Injury Fund
P.O. Box 45580
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0580
Henry K. Chai, II, Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 3000
Salt Lake City, UT 84110
Virginius Dabney, Attorney at Law
Kearns Building, Suite 412
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Industrial Indemnity
P.O. Box 7905
Murray, UT 84107
Carl Jay Spencer
1318 West 1300 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84104
N. V. Swire Bottlers, Inc.
P.O. Box 1647
Salt Lake City, UT 84110
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MOTION FOR REVIEW
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On or about November 15, 1985, an Order was entered by an Administrative Law Judge of the Commission wherein benefits were denied in the above

entitled

case.

On or about December 6, 1985, the Commission received a Motion for
Review from the Applicant by and through his attorney.
Thereafter, the matter was referred to the entire
review pursuant to Section 35-1-82.53, Utah Code Annotated.
has reviewed the file in the above entitled case and we are
that the Motion for Review should be denied and the Order of
tive Law Judge affirmed. In affirming, the Commission adopts
Fact and Conclusions of Law of the Administrative Law Judge.

Commission for
The C^iission
of t* opinion
the A ^inistrathe Findings of

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Order of the Administrative Law
Judge of November 15, 1985, shall be, and the same is hereby, affirmed and the
Motion for Review shall be, and the same is hereby, denied.

AiAl

^

Passed by the Industrial Commission
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this

Stebhen M. Hadley
Chairman

jiay of January, 1986.
-^
ATTEST:/
,

> ^ ;
Linda J. Strasburg
Commission Secretary

"Walter T. Axelgard
Commissioner

L. Nielsen
Commissioner

~y

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that on January _i£_ » 1986, a copy of the attached
Denial of Motion for Review in the case of Carl Jay Spencer, issued
January_j2^ 1986, was mailed to the following persons at the following
addresses, postage paid:

Carl Jay Spencer, 1318 West 1300 South, SLC, UT 84104
Virginius Dabney, Atty., 136 South Main, #412, SLC, UT 84101
Industrial Indemnity, P. 0. Box 7905, Murray, UT

84107

Henry K. Chai, II, Atty., P. 0. Box 3000, SLC, UT 84110
Erie V. Boorman, Administrator, Second Injury Fund
N. V. Swire Bottlers, Inc., P. 0. Box 1647, SLC, UT 84110
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